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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






DE SHAWN DRUMGO, 




SGT WILLIAM KUSCHEL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-14-cv-01135) 
District Judge:  Honorable Colm F. Connolly 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 11, 2020 
Before:  SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 







Pro se appellant De Shawn Drumgo appeals from the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Sergeant William Kuschel, the remaining 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




defendant in a civil rights action that Drumgo brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For 
the reasons discussed below, we will we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
In September 2014, Drumgo filed suit against various officers and employees of 
the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center and the Delaware Department of Corrections.  
Drumgo alleged, among other things, that he was sexually assaulted by Kuschel during a 
frisk search after leaving the prison dining hall on May 29, 2014.  The District Court 
dismissed the claims against several defendants, finding that Drumgo failed to allege 
their personal involvement or otherwise failed to state a claim against them.  The 
remaining defendants, including Kuschel, then moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that Drumgo had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by 
statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  The District Court granted that motion.  On appeal, we 
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the Eighth 
Amendment claim against Kuschel.  See Drumgo v. Kuschel, 684 F. App’x 228, 231 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (non-precedential).1 
 
1  Drumgo maintained that he had filed a grievance against Kuschel, but the defendants 
informed the District Court that there was no record of the grievance in the Delaware 
Automated Corrections System (DACS) database.  On appeal, the defendants informed 
this Court that a subsequent search “showed that Drumgo did file a grievance against 
Officer Kuschel.  Due to the allegations of sexual misconduct, the grievance was 
docketed in a separate DACS database to preserve confidentiality.  So, the grievance was 
not discovered during the initial search described in the affidavit on which the District 
Court relied.”  Drumgo, 684 F. App’x at 230–31.  
3 
 
On remand, the parties presented conflicting evidence regarding the May 29, 2014 
incident and its aftermath.  Drumgo maintains that, as he was exiting the dining hall, an 
officer directed Kuschel to frisk-search Drumgo.  In the course of the search, Kuschel 
told Drumgo not to say anything because no one was going to help him.  Kuschel 
proceeded to grope Drumgo’s legs in an inappropriate sexual manner, then grabbed and 
squeezed Drumgo’s penis until the skin ruptured.  Drumgo shouted, telling Kuschel to let 
go of his penis.  Drumgo maintains that he submitted a sick call slip for the injury and 
that he was seen by medical staff and given Bactrocin ointment.  He has suffered 
flashbacks and nightmares from the incident.  He claims that the incident was the second 
time that Kuschel sexually assaulted him, as Kuschel had caressed his nipples and 
buttocks at some unspecified prior date.  Drumgo submitted sworn statements from 
various inmates — including Isaiah Walker, Curtis Mercer, and Alem Lopez — who 
were present during the May 29, 2014 incident.  Those inmates corroborated Drumgo’s 
claim that Kuschel inappropriately searched his groin and genitals, deviating from the 
standard frisk search applied to inmates leaving the dining hall.  Those inmates also heard 
Drumgo yell out for Kuschel to let go of his penis. 
Kuschel denies Drumgo’s version of the events.  Kuschel maintains that he 
conducted a routine frisk search, with a glove, as he has been trained to do for safety.  He 
claims that he never grabbed Drumgo’s penis nor heard Drumgo yell.  Kuschel also 
searched other inmates in the same manner on May 29, 2014, and no other inmates 
4 
 
complained about the search or said that they were sexually assaulted.2  Correctional 
Officers VanGorder, Hutchins, Ingram, and Abernathy all corroborated Kuschel’s claim 
that the search was proper and that Drumgo did not yell anything.  Stanley Baynard, an 
internal affairs investigator, conducted a Prison Rape Elimination Act investigation and 
concluded that there was no credible evidence to substantiate Drumgo’s claim. 
The medical evidence in the record includes a May 29, 2014 sick call request from 
Drumgo, but that request did not mention any incident with Kuschel or any injury to 
Drumgo’s penis.  Nor do the other medical records support Drumgo’s assertion that he 
was treated for his alleged physical injury.  But there are records of the mental health 
treatment that Drumgo has received, including a treatment plan to address the distress, 
nightmares, and other symptoms that he claims he suffered as a result of the incident.  
Marc Richman, a licensed psychologist and Bureau Chief for the Bureau of Correctional 
Health Care Services, reviewed Drumgo’s mental healthcare files and noted that, 
although Drumgo claims to suffer from PTSD, no official diagnosis has been made. 
The District Court reviewed the evidence and granted summary judgment in favor 
of Kuschel.  The District Court determined that Kuschel was entitled to qualified 
immunity because Drumgo had not submitted sufficient evidence to support a finding that 
his Eighth Amendment rights were violated.  The District Court also determined that, to 
the extent that Drumgo sued Kuschel in his official capacity, Kuschel is immune from 
 
2  Alem Lopez stated that he was also sexually assaulted by Kuschel on May 29, 2014, 
and that he filed a grievance regarding the incident.  Kuschel maintains that Lopez’s 
statement is false because, among other things, there is no record of any such grievance 
in the DACS database. 
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suit under the Eleventh Amendment.3  Drumgo then filed a motion for reconsideration, 
which the District Court denied.  This appeal ensued. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  See Kaucher v. County of 
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2006).  Summary judgment is proper when, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all 
inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 
Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 422–23.  A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is 
sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the non-moving party.  See 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
III. 
 The Eighth Amendment protects prison inmates against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986).  To be actionable, the 
punishment must be “objectively, sufficiently serious,” and the corrections officer must 
have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 
(1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  We have previously recognized that 
sexual abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer may violate the Eighth Amendment.  
 
3  We will affirm the District Court’s ruling on that issue, which Drumgo has not 
challenged.  See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A]n 
appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of 
that issue on appeal.”). 
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See Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 2018).  As with other Eighth 
Amendment claims, “the incident must be objectively, sufficiently intolerable and cruel, 
capable of causing harm, and the official must have a culpable state of mind.”  Id. at 475.  
In Ricks, we concluded that “a single incident, if sufficiently serious or severe, can run 
afoul of the Eighth Amendment as surely as can multiple, less egregious incidents.”  Id. 
at 477.  In the “contextual, fact-specific” inquiry into an incident, “[t]he scope, place, and 
timing of the offensive conduct will bear on its severity, as will the details of the alleged 
contact.”  Id. at 478. 
 Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages 
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982).  Qualified immunity applies unless: (1) the facts alleged by the plaintiff 
show the violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the law was clearly established at the 
time of the violation.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).  “Just as the 
granting of summary judgment is inappropriate when a genuine issue exists as to any 
material fact, a decision on qualified immunity will be premature when there are 
unresolved disputes of historical fact relevant to the immunity analysis.”  Curley v. Klem, 
298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 420 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
 Here, the District Court erred in ruling, under the first prong of the qualified 
immunity analysis, that the facts set forth by Drumgo are insufficient to establish an 
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Eighth Amendment violation.4  The District Court observed, correctly, that the prison has 
a legitimate penological interest in searching inmates as they leave the dining hall, which 
weighs against finding an Eighth Amendment violation.  See Ricks, 891 F.3d at 475–76.  
But the remaining material facts are disputed, and — when viewed in the light most 
favorable to Drumgo — they are sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that the 
May 29, 2014 incident was “objectively, sufficiently intolerable and cruel, capable of 
causing harm” and that Kuschel had “a culpable state of mind.”  Id. at 475.  
 Specifically, Drumgo and multiple other inmates state that Kuschel went well 
beyond the legitimate scope of the search, grabbing Drumgo’s genitals and causing 
Drumgo to yell out for Kuschel to let go of his penis.  Drumgo states that the skin of his 
penis ruptured and that he received medical attention for the injury.  See id. at 477 
(noting that “physical injury will certainly signal severity” of the misconduct).  He also 
claims to have suffered psychological trauma from the incident, which is corroborated, at 
least in part, by his mental healthcare records.  See id. (noting that “the absence of force 
or injury will not doom a sexual abuse claim outright,” as the harmful effects of sexual 
abuse include distress and other psychological harm).  And Drumgo claims to have been 
sexually harassed by Kuschel on a previous occasion.5  Given this evidence, the District 
 
4  The District Court did not reach the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, 
and Kuschel has not argued that the second prong provides an alternative basis to affirm 
the District Court’s ruling on appeal.  See E. D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 307–08 (3d 
Cir. 2019). 
5  Drumgo does not challenge the District Court’s ruling that there is insufficient evidence 
for a reasonable juror to find that this prior incident constitutes an independent Eighth 




Court erred in concluding that the alleged misconduct does not “fall within the examples 
of misconduct identified in Ricks.”  ECF No. 145 at 17.  Compare Ricks, 891 F.3d at 478 
(noting that the sexualized fondling and squeezing of an inmate’s penis are examples of 
conduct that violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 Of course, as Kuschel argues, much of the evidence indicates that the entire May 
29, 2014 frisk search was properly conducted, that it served a legitimate penological 
interest, that Kuschel did not grab Drumgo’s penis, that Drumgo did not yell out or 
complain, and that he did not suffer any injuries.  But weighing that evidence against 
Drumgo’s evidence is a factual issue that “must be resolved by a jury, not a judge.”  
Santini, 795 F.3d at 420.  Thus, while Kuschel notes the absence of medical records 
showing the alleged physical injury and treatment, we conclude that summary judgment 
was not warranted, as a reasonable juror could still believe Drumgo’s account of his 
injury based on the record here.  See generally Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 326 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (noting the difficulty that an inmate proceeding pro se faces in attempting to 
“generate record evidence,” and that “affidavits . . . are about the best that can be 
expected from him” at summary judgment) (quotation marks and citations omitted).6 
 Therefore, we will vacate the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the 
Eighth Amendment claim against Kuschel in his individual capacity, and we will vacate 
 
6  Drumgo challenges the District Court’s discovery rulings, but, at this stage, he has not 
shown actual and substantial prejudice from the any of those rulings.  See Anderson v. 
Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We review a district court’s 
discovery orders for abuse of discretion, and will not disturb such an order absent a 
showing of actual and substantial prejudice.”).  Whether additional discovery is permitted 
is left to the sound discretion of the District Court. 
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the District Court’s denial of Drumgo’s motion to reconsider that decision.  See Santini, 
795 F.3d at 420.  The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
Drumgo’s state law claims based on its resolution of his federal claims.  The District 
Court may not need to reconsider that decision on remand.  The District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Drumgo’s various motions for appointment of counsel, but 
we express no opinion on the merit of any renewed counsel motion on remand.  See 
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Houser v. Folino, 927 F.3d 693, 
698 (3d Cir. 2019) (“District courts should consider the Tabron guideposts that may be 
relevant to any particular request for counsel, including successive requests, at the time 
and stage of litigation that the request is made.”).  
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in part, see supra 
n.3 & n.5, vacate the judgment in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  Drumgo’s pending motions are denied. 
